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INTRODUCTION 
At best, the Electoral College, utilized in the election of the President of the United 
States, is widely misunderstood; at worst, it is downright mistrusted.2  The United States 
Constitution assigns to “Electors” from each state the right and responsibility of casting the 
actual votes, thus electing the President and Vice President.3  Article II allows each respective 
state to determine how it appoints its Electors.4  Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted statutory provisions that appoint their Electors on a Winner-Takes-All (WTA) 
basis, whereby the political party of the candidate receiving the most popular votes within the 
state selects that state’s Electors.5  
                                                             
2 See Art Swift, American’s Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply, GALLUP (Dec. 2, 2016) 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/198917/americans-support-electoral-college-rises-sharply.aspx. Attitudes towards the 
Electoral College have changed over the years, from an all-time high approval rating of 80% in 1968, to 2016’s 
47%.  However, lawsuits challenging the current electoral college indicate a growing distrust of the system.  See 
Lyman v. Baker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D. Mass. 2018). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  It should be noted that in addition to the Electors’ right to vote for the President, the 
Constitution implicitly assigns to Electors the nominating power.  See infra note 89 and accompanying text.   
4 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 n.18 (1983) (noting constitutional delegation of presidential 
Elector selection to states); Christopher Anglim, A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Electoral College:  Its 
Creation, History, and Prospects for Reform, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 297, 299 (1993) (describing wide discretion given to 
states in appointing Electors).   
5 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 148 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-13-301 
(West 2018) (codifying respective states’ WTA provisions); NAT’L ASSOC. OF SEC’YS OF STATE, SUMMARY:  STATE 
LAWS REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS (2016), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/2017-
08/research-state-laws-pres-electors-nov16.pdf (cataloging states’ various Elector laws).  Accordingly, the vote of 
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Under the WTA scheme, the political party of the presidential and vice presidential 
candidates who win the most popular votes in a state is awarded all of that state’s Electors.6  This 
is the case regardless of whether—for example—the party’s candidates garner only 41.9% of the 
popular vote and only 3,829 more votes than the next vote-getter in the state (as President 
Ronald Reagan did in Massachusetts in 1980) or as much as 76.2% of the popular vote and as 
many as 1,236,695 more votes than the next vote-getter in the state (as President Lyndon 
Johnson did in Massachusetts in 1964).7  The WTA system thus effectively disenfranchises those 
voters who vote for candidates other than those receiving the most votes in their state. 
WTA also distorts presidential campaigns.  Considering only a small margin of victory in 
the popular vote in a state can deliver all of that state’s electoral votes, WTA necessarily leads 
campaigns to focus on “battleground states” where the two major political parties each believe 
their candidates can achieve popular vote victory for that year’s election.8  In fact, just four of the 
2016 election’s battleground states (Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) saw 71% 
of campaign advertising spending and 57% of candidate appearances.9  Moreover, the top 
fourteen 2016 battleground states10 saw 99% of advertising spending and 95% of candidate 
appearances.11  From this data, it is clear that WTA results in presidential campaigns routinely 
turning focus away from tens of millions of citizens in non-battleground states such as 
Massachusetts.  WTA effectively incentivize candidates for President and Vice President to give 
disproportionate attention to an unrepresentative subset of the country, ultimately providing that 
                                                             
every citizen voting for a candidate other than the leading candidate is rendered meaningless by receiving no Elector 
representation directly or through a political party. 
6 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 148; see also NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. ELECTORAL C., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html#wtapv 
[https://perma.cc/DVP7-GPNC] (outlining Electoral College).   
The District of Columbia and 48 states have a Winner-takes-all rule for the Electoral College.  In 
these states, whichever candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, or a plurality of the 
popular vote (less than 50 percent but more than any other candidate), takes all of the state’s 
electoral votes. 
NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra.  
7 See 1964 Presidential General Election Results-Massachusetts, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&fips=25&year=1964 [https://perma.cc/JZ78-AL9J 
] (showing 1964 Massachusetts presidential election results); 1980 Presidential General Election Results-
Massachusetts, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&fips=25&year=1980 (showing 1980 Massachusetts presidential 
election results).  
8See NONPROFIT VOTE, AMERICA GOES TO THE POLLS 2016:  A REPORT ON VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2016 ELECTION 
12 (2017), https://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2017/03/america-goes-polls-2016.pdf/ 
[https://perma.cc/SA4F-26PN].   
9 See CANDIDATES MAKE LAST DITCH AD SPENDING PUSH ACROSS 14-STATE ELECTORAL MAP (2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2016-presidential-campaign-tv-ads/, (breaking down both candidate’s 
ad spending in fourteen states during the 2016 election). 
10 See id.  The 2016 battleground states collectively included only 35% of eligible voters; they were Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
11 See id. at 7, 12. 
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unrepresentative subset outsized political influence.  Under such circumstances, the presidential 
election does not reflect or include the voices of millions across the entire nation. 
Despite current sentiment to the contrary, it is the WTA system, not the Electoral College 
itself, that plagues the health of our body politic.  Section I of this Article begins first by 
providing the necessary historical discussion of the Framers’ debates over the mode12 of 
presidential selection that resulted in the use of presidential Electors.13  It identifies five core 
principles by which every mode was measured, determining these constitutional priorities that 
governed the decisions.14  Next, section I of this article will recount the history behind the first 
four presidential elections, where the manner of elector necessitated the introduction of the 
Twelfth Amendment.15 Section II will explore the language and purpose of the Twelfth 
Amendment.16  Next, section II of this Article argues that history does not mandate the usage of 
WTA, and in fact, supports the argument that WTA is antithetical to our constitutional origins.17  
After detailing the constitutional history of presidential elections and WTA, that the WTA 
system results in problems that may amount to violations of the constitutional requirements of 
the mode of presidential selection, and the Twelfth Amendment.18  Finally, section III of this 
proposes, by statistical analysis of the last several elections, that the best remedy to these ills is 
not to kill the Electoral College—with a national popular vote or otherwise—but to put WTA to 
rest.19  The replacement to WTAs, as a matter of federalism theory and practical consequence, is 
what these authors have termed the “Proportional Elector Manner.”   
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE MODE OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 
By the accounts of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the United States 
Constitution did not simply reflect ideas generated and refined by its Framers during the 
Constitutional Convention, but rather synthesized those policies and practices already at work in 
the constitutions of the states and other countries.20  The convention debates, the Federalist 
Papers, and the Framers’ correspondence reveal that these fifty-five men turned their attention to 
a wide variety of complex issues.  Yet, throughout their debates, in their decisions, and during 
their drafting, the Framers remained focused on certain key principles to simplify and clarify the 
federal system of government that they were building.  All these focused on the transcendent 
                                                             
12 For the purposes of this Article, we define a “mode” as a means of presidential selection, and a “manner” as a 
means of Elector appointment.   
13 See infra Section II.A (discussing historical background of proposed presidential election modes). 
14 See infra Parts II.A.1-5. 
15 See infra Part II.B.1. 
16 See infra Part II.B.2. 
17 See infra Part III.A (arguing constitutional history opposes WTA use).  
18 See infra Part III.B (making legal arguments to WTA). 
19 See infra Section IV (outlining “Proportional Elector Manner”). 
20 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 211-12 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1991) (describing state 
constitutional values implemented in creation of Federal Constitution); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218 (Ohio Univ. Press, 1966) [hereinafter MADISON’S JOURNAL] (comparing 
foreign governments to state systems).  
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goals of preserving liberty for all and preventing tyranny by any.21  These lofty ideals manifested 
in elaborate systems and structures—sometimes deliberately inefficient—but often decidedly 
effective in preserving, protecting, and defending the Framers’ avowed ambition “to form a more 
perfect union.”22  
The federal government splits power with those granted to individual state governments 
and its own delegated enumerated powers.23  The structure of the national government 
correspondingly reflected three forms of republican character.  First:  directly, by deriving “all its 
powers . . .  from the great body of the people”24—namely by electing Representatives by 
popular vote.   Second:  indirectly, by electing Senators by state legislative appointment.  Finally, 
by “a very compound source” specifically by electing the President through the Electors of the 
several  states, acting “partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the 
same society.”25  The Framers intended these separate sources of power to assure the 
independence of each branch of government.26  These principles informed the Framers’ debates 
and decisions on virtually all topics, and influenced their drafting of virtually all provisions.   
Before addressing WTA specifically, this Article first reviews the modes of presidential 
selection debated by the Framers, focusing specifically on those considerations that played a key 
role in the Framers’ decision that the Electoral College was a “more perfect” compromise.   
The process of electing the President and Vice President has changed substantially since 
the first election, but the current process retains some (but certainly not all) of the characteristics 
thought important by the Framers.27  That said, the Framers’ debates remain informative given 
                                                             
21 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (synthesizing 
the essence of U.S. government is to “leave to live by no man’s leave.”).  Id. at 654.  
22 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
23 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 211 (James Madison) (identifying balance of state sovereignty and 
republican representation); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
24 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 209 (James Madison). 
25 See id. at 210, 212. 
26 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 311-12 (quoting James Madison)  “If it be essential to the 
preservation of liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers be sparate, it is essential to a 
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other.”  Id. at 311. 
27 See JAMES W. CEASAR, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:  THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 42 (1979) (discussing theory 
behind popular election).  Originally, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution required electors to be proportioned by 
a state’s number of representatives and senators.  Each elector was given two votes, one of which had to be cast for a 
candidate from outside the elector’s state.  If there was a tie above the majority threshold, the House would pick 
from the tied candidates.  If there was a tie below the majority threshold, the House would consolidate 
representatives by state, give each state a vote, and require a majority of those votes to select a winner.  Id. at 42-43 
n.1.  Much of this was superseded by the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804.  See L. PAIGE WHITAKER 
& THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30804, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:  AN OVERVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS at 2 (2004) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30804.pdf.  Since that 
time, the closest Congress has come to changing the mode of presidential selection was during the 91st Congress, 
when House Judiciary Resolution 681 proposed the direct election of the President and Vice President, requiring a 
runoff when no candidate received more than 40% of the vote.  The resolution passed the House in 1969 but failed 
to pass the Senate.  See id. at 18.   
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their extended consideration of the topic.28  The Framers knew that the mode of presidential 
selection must come from “some existing authority under the National or States Constitutions, by 
some special authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves.”29  The Framers 
consequently explored five principal modes of selection:  by the national legislature, by state 
executives, by state legislatures, by national popular vote, and by state-chosen Electors.30   
In ultimately adopting the Electoral College, the Framers sought to incorporate both 
national and federal interests, simultaneously respecting the independent sovereignty of the states 
and reflecting the delegated powers of the national government.31  Additionally, maintaining the 
independence of the Executive was among the Framers’ principal concerns.32  In turning to a 
review of the debated modes of section, it is helpful to keep in mind that, as James Madison 
opined, one of the Constitution’s core aims is to elect leaders “who possesses most wisdom to 
discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good.”33  
A. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
We are particularly fortunate that the Framers widely and exhaustively discussed the 
mode of presidential election.34  From these debates and discussions, we can distill the principles 
with which the Framers were concerned in ultimately deciding upon the Elector mode.  
Ultimately, the use of Electors appeared the least susceptible to tyranny and the most 
                                                             
28 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 362-66 (quoting James Madison).  James Wilson characterized the 
mode of presidential selection as the most difficult that they were tasked to decide.  See id. at 578.   
29 Id. at 363 (quoting James Madison).  
30 Some modes derived from these authorities were not considered, except in passing.  See id. at 363 (quoting 
Madison saying selection by judiciary “presumed … out of the question”).  “The State [Judiciaries] had [not been, 
and he] presumed [would not be,] proposed as a proper source of appointment.”  Id. at 365.  Proposed modes varied 
widely, with some seeking to incorporate a lottery system.  Id. at 359, 370–71.  There was pushback against leaving 
the appointment up to chance.  Id. at 362.  
31 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 212 (James Madison).   
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source.  The immediate election of 
the President is to be made by the States in their political characters.  The votes allotted to them 
are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as 
unequal members of the same society.  The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch 
of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to 
be thrown into the form of individual delegations from so many distinct and coequal bodies 
politic. 
Id.  
32 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 46-47 (discussing Randolph, Wilson, and Madison opinions on 
presidential independence).  Some of the Framers recognized that the mode of selection for the president depended 
heavily on those powers delegated to the Executive, and those checks on the office thereof.  See id. at 582-84.   
33 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 20, at 318 (James Madison). 
34 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:  THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (U. of Chi. Press 2004).  The mode of selection is objectively one of the most 
thoroughly covered topics within Madison’s Journal, however many scholars point out that the journal itself only 
accounts for 10% of each day’s total discussions.  See id. at 15.  
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preservative of liberty.35  Studying these debates allowed us to identify those values the Framers 
required of the presidential selection process.  This Article now attempts to identify those 
principles the Framers deemed important in selecting the president,36 and then analyzes WTA 
considering these values to see how this manner measures up against those principles the 
Framers ultimately identified as important.37   
1. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST CONTAIN FACTIONALISM 
The Framers required any mode of presidential selection to prevent factionalism from 
seizing the engine of governance.  Gouverneur Morris explained how a special purpose body of 
Electors was superior to a standing legislative body, because it avoided:  “the danger of intrigue 
and faction”—as was expected in any legislature.38  Hamilton described these “factions” as:  
“[A] number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are 
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”39  Reasonably, one 
such faction that falls under Hamilton’s definition was voter’s state allegiance.40  Madison noted 
weighty difficulties remained, which unquestioningly reflected his presumption that individuals 
would self-identify at the state level,  perhaps standing above having a unified national interest or 
unquestioning fidelity to a national government.41  Enduring state identification would likely 
have resulted in the “disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State,” which 
would necessarily disadvantage small states.42 
Charles Pinckney found popular elections to be vulnerable to the will of “a few active 
and designing men” who might assume leadership over each state’s election, and that more well-
populated states might collude to advance their own shared priorities, even when not consistent 
with the national interest.43  Oliver Ellsworth also concluded that Madison’s view was 
“unanswerable,” with the largest states’ citizens’ invariably preferring in-state candidates and the 
largest states “invariably hav[ing] the man.”44   
                                                             
35 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 20, at 223 (James Madison) (reflecting on choosing the greater, not the 
perfect, good). 
36 Infra Part II.A.1-5. 
37 Infra Part III.A.1-5. 
38 MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 576-77 (indicating reasoning for special purpose of body of Electors). 
39 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 46 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
40 See id. at 50 (describing faction from “local prejudices”). 
41 MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 364-65 (quoting James Madison).  Perhaps aiming to disprove his own 
(widely shared) point by his actions, Madison suggested that “he was willing to make the sacrifice” of dealing with 
the near-term consequences of certain proposed uniform electoral mechanics that, given then-prevailing regional 
differences in democratic practices and population demographics, disadvantaged his state, which was both Southern 
and large.  See id. at 365-66.  There is no record that his actions influenced the thinking of any of his fellow Framers 
on the question of direct popular election. 
42 Id. at 365 (quoting James Madison). 
43 Id. at 307 (quoting Charles Pickney). 
44 Id. at 366 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth). 
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There also existed another factional “difficulty … of a serious nature.”45  This difficulty 
was that with, for example, a direct popular national vote, the Southern States “could have no 
influence in the election” given that their eligible voter populations were significantly smaller 
than those of the Northern States.46  Madison diagnosed this problem as arising out of pragmatic 
circumstances, notwithstanding the underlying moral complexities.  In modern terms, while all 
states limited voting by gender, the Southern states further constrained voting by restricting 
voting rights by socioeconomic class and denying voting rights by race.47  Madison did not 
address the moral aspect of this challenge, simply noting that the “substitution of electors 
obviated this difficulty.”48  In pursuit of uniting the states, Madison and the other Framers 
protected the Southern States against any adverse consequences from their in-state 
discriminatory voting practices, which some of the Southern States long thereafter continued 
with legacy manifestations to the present. But, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, this 
was simply a political reality if any union—much less a more perfect one—were to be formed at 
all. 
2.  THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE RESISTANT TO POPULAR EXCITEMENT 
One of the common themes to the Constitution—and a tenet of republican 
representation—was that decisions ought to be made divorced of populist emotions.49  The 
Framers understood the power of populism and feared the power of the Executive in the hands of 
what they called a “demagogue,” namely a political leader who gained power through exciting 
passion and intrigue in the people.50  Protecting against demagogues was an imperative for the 
presidential election no matter which mode was ultimately chosen.  In Federalist No.10, 
Alexander Hamilton explained how proportional representation was meant to be a buffer 
designed to “aggregate [the] interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the 
State legislatures.”51  Hamilton argued that an elected representative of a district serves as “a 
medium of the chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest in their 
                                                             
45 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327 (quoting James Madison).  
46 See id. (quoting James Madison). 
47 See id. (quoting James Madison).  “The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the 
Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the [black population.]”  Id.   
48 See id. (quoting James Madison). 
49 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 235 (quoting Gouverneur Morris stating the “people never act from 
reason alone”). 
50 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 20, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing demagogues).  
Demagogues . . . flatter the public, and . . . stoke division, anger and resentment.  Demagogues 
promise that they will restore lost glories and make everything right again.  They divert the 
public's attention to enemies and scapegoats within and without the republic.  They divide the 
public in order to conquer it.  They play on people's fears of loss of status.  They use divisive 
rhetoric to distract attention, maintain a loyal set of supporters, and keep themselves in power.   
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 152 (2017). 
51 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 51 (James Madison).  
 A MORE PERFECT ELECTORAL COLLEGE 12 
country.”52  The mechanisms of the Constitution were designed so that true leaders of virtue 
would materialize on a national stage.53   
The safety mechanism to prevent such abuse is having the appropriate size of districts 
within the election.54  Hamilton explained that by using representatives to represent districts in a 
larger scheme acts as a means to quarantine those factions of “sinister designs” that have taken 
hold of their electorate.55  When choosing the appropriate size of a district, on one hand, a district 
must be small enough that the representative is “acquainted with all their local circumstances and 
lesser interests.”56  On the other hand, the district must be large enough “to comprehend and 
pursue great and national objects.”57  Containing representation to a Republican mode “renders 
factious combinations less to be dreaded.”58  Indeed, Hamilton anticipated this quarantine model 
in the context of a district to that of the larger, national scheme, when he said:   
[When] you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more 
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with 
each other.59  
If such a demagogue were to rise to power in one district, his or her metaphorical 
sickness was difficult to spread to another, and it would take overwhelming support during an 
election of other such demagogues of the same nature to acquire power.60  Even if a demagogue 
were to capture the support of numerous districts, the quarantining quality of effective districting 
would inoculate the remaining electorate.  
3. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST ENSURE EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENCE 
The Framers in general, and Hamilton in particular, identified the necessity of executive 
independence from the influence of the other two branches of government.61  Imbued with 
federalist philosophy, the Framers perceived a close relationship between national and state 
                                                             
52 See id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
53 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 20, at 318 (James Madison). 
54 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 46-57 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).  
Gouverneur Morris disagreed that “a few designing men” might influence the vote by their “activity and intrigues,” 
except in “a small district.”  MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 2020, at 307-08.  He proclaimed “[i]t can never 
happen throughout the continent” that “those little combinations and those momentary lies, which often decide 
popular elections within a narrow sphere” might influence a national election.  Id.  Morris ultimately doubted that 
collusive and combined action in and by populous states might arise from an at-large election with nearly the same 
likelihood that it might arise from elections by the state legislatures.  Id. (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
55 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 50-51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
56 See id. at 51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 51 (James Madison) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
60 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 307–08 (quoting Gouverneur Morris describing the “quarantine” 
ability of effective districting). 
61 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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legislatures, just as they saw an intertwined dynamic between the national legislature and the 
national executive.  Achieving this balanced structure required that the legislative branch have 
the power to impeach the executive for his “incapacity, negligence, or perfidy.”62  But with this 
remedy came risk; there was concern that giving the legislature both the power to appoint and 
remove the President might make the executive its “mere creature.”63  If the President was too 
weak, the legislature could “usurp” the executive’s powers; but if the President was given too 
much power, the legislature could have been rendered meaningless.64  In the words of 
Gouverneur Morris, either “legislative tyranny” or an “elective monarch” might arise from an 
unbalanced structure.65 
The Framers engaged in extensive discussion at the Convention about the possibility of 
the national legislature selecting the President.66  But they ultimately rejected this approach as 
inconsistent with several of the Framers’ key principles, including separation of powers among 
the branches and the allocation of power between states and the national government.  Keeping 
legislative and executive powers separate was an “indispensable necessity” for the Framers.67  
Even with this check in place, it remained “the most difficult of all rightly to balance the 
Executive.”68   
These two perspectives together led the Framers to reject executive selection by state 
legislatures.  As the national legislature was meant to control the “strong propensity [of state 
legislatures] to a variety of pernicious measures,” so too the national executive “was to control 
the National Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity.”69  As with 
selection by the national legislatures, so too with state legislatures–the risk endured that larger 
states might routinely prevail over smaller states.70  Aside from separation of powers concerns, 
Madison expressed two practical concerns about legislative selection.  First, he was concerned 
this mode would “agitate [and] divide” the legislature and cause the public interest to “materially 
suffer.”71  There was also concern that legislative selection of the President might render the veto 
power72 meaningless, as the legislature might appoint someone who it knew would not exercise 
                                                             
62 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 332 (quoting James Madison). 
63 See id. at 56 (quoting George Mason); see also id. at 327 (quoting James Madison positing “free agency” of 
executive from legislatures deemed “essential”). 
64 MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327.   
65 See id. at 525-26 (quoting Gouverneur Morris); see also id. at 136-37 (anticipating fears of Executive becoming 
“elective monarch”). 
66 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 367 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
67 Id. at 577 (quoting Elbridge Gerry). 
68 Id. at 361 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
69 Id. at 364 (quoting James Madison). 
70 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 366 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth); id. at 368-69 (quoting John 
Dickinson). 
71 See id. at 363 (quoting James Madison). 
72 This is the only check on presidential power expressly authorized under Article I.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
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this necessary check on the House.73  Others expressed reserve that this mode of selection would 
likely beholden the executive to the larger states.74  
Ultimately, the selection of the President by either the state legislators, Governors, or 
national legislature was rejected for its propensity to degrade the independence of the 
executive.75  Hamilton believed that the nature of a detached person, without a position of trust 
or profit, for the sole purpose of selecting the President, would help insulate the executive from 
bribery or corruption.76  His writings identify how such separation protected appointment:   
[The Electors] have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any 
preexisting bodies of men who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute 
their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the 
people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and 
sole purpose of making the appointment.77   
4. THOSE WHO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST KNOW OF THE CANDIDATE’S QUALITIES. 
The Elector system was largely intended to serve as an extension of republican 
representation of the people for the sole purpose of selecting the President.78  It thus appears that 
one of the driving considerations in the use of Electors appeared to be the availability of 
information to help voters make such an important decision.79  Many of the Framers doubted the 
abilities of the people to even obtain the necessary information to make an informed decision.80  
For example, as a second basis for supporting Madison’s view that state-centric concerns might 
dictate voters’ choices in a popular election, Roger Sherman posited that the people at large were 
not capable of being “sufficiently informed of [the leading] characters.”81  George Mason 
expressed this sentiment more starkly, asserting that the people might no more chose “a proper 
character for” President than a blind man might pass “a trial of colours.”82  
                                                             
73 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 363-64 (quoting Madison); see also id. at 325-26 (quoting Edmund 
Randolph). 
74 See id. at 325-26 (suggesting that legislative selection might occur either by joint ballot by both houses or by 
nomination by the lower house and appointment by the upper house); see also id. at 94 (quoting David Brearly’s 
identification of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia as larger states).  
75 See id. at 322, 325 (describing dangers of proposed appointment by state executives); supra note 63 and 
accompanying text (describing danger of appointment by national legislature); supra note 69 and accompanying text 
(describing danger of appointment by state legislature).  
76 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton). 
77 See id. 
78 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 368-69 (quoting John Dickinson).  “Let the people of each State 
choose its best Citizen.  The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of 
different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud.”  Id. 
at 369.   
79 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing Elector more likely to “possess 
the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations”).   
80 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 306 (quoting Roger Sherman). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 308 (quoting George Mason). 
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Gouverneur Morris took the opposite view, believing that “[i]f the people should elect, 
they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he 
might so speak, of continental reputation.”83  Even when acknowledging that “the multitude will 
be uninformed,”  Morris theorized that the people would know “of those great [and] illustrious 
characters which have merited their esteem & confidence.”84  Morris categorically linked 
accomplishment to fame, concluding “[i]t cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently 
distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his character proclaimed by fame 
throughout the Empire.”85   
However, skepticism won the day, and this priority was one of the driving forces to 
ensure the use of Electors to be appointed in some fashion.  Before the popularization of 
selection of Electors by general vote, appointment of Electors by state legislators was a popular 
choice amongst states for this exact reason, as most voters understood their vote for their state 
legislator to actually be a vote for the President.86  This particular concern, brought up at most 
mentions of the National Popular Vote (“NPV”), was one of the principle reasons that the NPV 
mode was denied.  
5. THE MODE TO SELECT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE’S 
WILL 
The Framers settled on the Elector mode because it embodied the truest balance between 
direct representations of the people whilst simultaneously preventing human error.  According to 
Hamilton,  
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; 
which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as 
Electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the 
national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit 
person as President.  Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of 
the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of 
the whole number of votes will be the President.87  
The system of federal representation—having a balance between the House and the 
Senate—was created to simultaneously balance the will of the people in their capacity as citizens 
of the nation as a whole and their interests as members of a sovereign state.88  Madison himself 
realized that the purpose of Electoral College was represent those dual interests in the 
presidential elections.89  The college was designed not to interpose its will or change the choice 
of the people; the evidence of rigorous debate in support of the NPV is evidence of this idea’s 
                                                             
83 Id. at 306 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
84 Id. at 308 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
85 Id. at 324 (quoting Gouverneur Morris). 
86 See infra note 94 (explaining voting population’s understanding state representatives appointed Electors).  
87 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
88 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (describing 
American government system). 
89 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 464 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 A MORE PERFECT ELECTORAL COLLEGE 16 
importance.90  By implication, it reveals that when the vote of the people was changed by the 
college, which has happened five times in history, there ought to be a danger that the college was 
systemically curing.   
B. WTAS AND THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 
1. THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE II 
Understanding of the Twelfth Amendment starts with understanding the language of 
Article II.  
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two 
persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves. . . .  The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the 
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an 
equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately 
choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then 
from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the 
President. . . .  In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having 
the greatest number of votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if 
there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose 
from them by ballot the Vice President. 91 
The original Article II system allowed Electors to nominate and select two individuals for 
President, requiring that one vote be cast for a candidate not from their own state.92  However, 
the Electors were not permitted to cast their vote specifically for the President or Vice, but rather 
choose the two candidates believed best qualified to serve.93  At its heart, this Electoral system 
was designed to select the fittest candidate, but also served as a means to proportionally protect 
those smaller states with fewer Electors.94  However, the deficiencies of this troublesome two-
vote Elector, lying just below the surface of the elections of 1789 and 1792, would rear its ugly 
head in 1796 and 1800.95  Combined with a rise in Democratic Republican party power, those 
latter hotly contested elections would eventually birth the Twelfth Amendment.   
After the return of the 1790 census, Congress passed a law to proportionally assign the 
states their Congressional representation and number of Electors.96  At this time, the states were 
                                                             
90 E.g. Norman R. Williams, Why The National Popular Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV. 
1523, 1523 (2012); Stanley Chang, Recent Development: Updating The Electoral College: The National Popular 
Vote Legislation, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205, 216 (2007). 
91 U.S. CONST. art II., § 1 (describing original presidential selection process).  
92 See CEASAR, supra note 27, at 79-80 (discussing mechanisms of original Article II language). 
93 See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT:  THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 140 (1994).  
94 See id. at 140.  
95 See id. at 108. 
96 See id. at 53. 
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divided between those appointing their Electors and those allowing the people to vote for them.97  
In the case of appointed Electors, state legislators were seen as expressing the preference of the 
people in choosing presidential Electors.98   
The election of 1796, however, revealed the insufficiency of this electoral procedure.  
The rift between Federalists, now slipping from power, and Republicans brought forth calls for 
party “faithful, not independent and maverick, [E]lectors.”99  The Electors’ strategic 
maneuvering resulted in their voting for the candidate of their choosing, and “scattering” their 
second vote amongst thirteen other candidates to bolster their actual choice.100  These practices 
led to the presidency of John Adams, with Thomas Jefferson as Vice President.101  The election 
of 1796 “sow[ed] the seeds of division between Jefferson and Burr and between Hamilton and 
Adams” that would reap the whirlwind of 1800.102  
 A “complete mess” most aptly describes the election of 1800.  New York proved to be 
the most important battleground state, as it had WTAs in place for its appointed Electors.  
Republicans diligently and successfully ran their campaigns because they understood state 
legislators as the key to obtaining Electors.103  Aaron Burr began his campaign in New York City 
with a star-studded presidential ticket.104  Sensing a Federalist defeat in New York, Alexander 
Hamilton attempted to change Elector selection from legislative appointment to a district voting 
process in a deal with the governor, a move viewed by most as less-than-scrupulous.105  
Problems arose when Hamilton characterized this tactic as trying to change the rules of the game, 
and “take what they had not won.”106  Adams and Hamilton, attempting to place their thumbs on 
the scales, harmed Federalists irreparably nationally.107  Federalist Electors, sensing their defeat, 
threw Electoral votes to Republican Aaron Burr to trigger a tie between the two Republican 
frontrunners.108  Federalists knew that in the event of a tie, Article II directed that the House of 
Representatives elect the president.109  Republicans accused the Federalists’ support of Burr as “a 
defeat of the Election & usurpation of the Government by some creature whom they intend to 
                                                             
97 See id. at 54-55, 110. 
98 See TADAHISA KURODA, supra note 93 at, 83-84, 86. 
99 Id. at 69. 
100 Id. at 70. 
101 See id. at 70.  
102 See id. at 72. 
103 See TADAHISA KURODA, supra note 93 at, 84.  
104 See id. at 84. 
105 See id. at 85.  
106 See id. at 86. 
107 See id. at 91.   
108 See id. at 97-98.  James Madison had anticipated this exact problem with the original mode of presidential 
selection during the Constitutional Convention.  See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 368 (discussing various 
voting mechanisms). 
109 See U.S. CONST. art. II.  Jefferson and Burr had each received 73 votes, with 65 to Adams, 64 to Pinckney, and 1 
to Jay.  See KURODA, supra note 94, at 102 (noting that the House was then only able to proceed balloting for 
Jefferson and Burr after this count). 
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designate by law.”110  Despite Federalist attempts to supplant the national support of the 
Republicans, Congress elected Jefferson as President on their 36th attempt.111 
This history provides us with the essential context to understand why the Eighth 
Congress sought to correct the Constitution’s course by proposing the Twelfth Amendment.112  
By 1801, the Constitution clearly contained two large weaknesses in the mode of presidential 
selection.113  First, the Electors could use their votes to manipulate the Article II system, as seen 
in both 1796 and 1800.  Despite the people’s preference, Electors’ vote manipulation failed to 
“transmit” the vote of the people, as commanded by Article II.  Corruption in the manner of 
selecting the Electors also presented itself as a problem.114  At the time,  the choice for selecting 
Electors was boiled down to two options:  legislative appointment or popular election, the latter 
further subdivided into elections in districts or general tickets.115  The second concern demanded 
an amendment needed to “prevent state legislators from setting aside the clear wishes of the 
majority of the people.”116  The Twelfth Amendment answered this call by seeking to 
fundamentally protect the effective participation of the people in the presidential election 
process. 
2.  THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT ENTERS 
 The text of the Twelfth Amendment states, in relevant part: 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President 
and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same 
state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as 
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they 
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons 
voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they 
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the 
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.117   
The history of the first four elections revealed problematic political maneuvering on the 
part of the Electors. To solve this political maneuvering problem, the Twelfth Amendment 
                                                             
110 See KURODA, supra note 93, at 101.  It is important to note that this is a drastic oversimplification of the election 
of 1800.  Entire books have been written on the subject, however, understanding these basic facts are essential to 
understanding what the Twelfth Amendment was written to fix.  
111 See id. at 105.   
112 See id. at 127. 
113 See id. at 114.  Of all the vast disagreements between Federalists and Republicans, this was common ground that 
both sides could find.  Madison himself admitted that the mode had failed the charge of the Constitution, and that an 
amendment was needed.  See id. at 113. 
114 See KURODA, supra note 94, at 113 (indicating that after an aristocratic has won, suffrage rights were deprived).  
115 See id. (noting that Jefferson wanted to keep his party’s options open). 
116 Id. at 114.  Proponents of the Twelfth Amendment believed that the Framers, some of them still living and 
involved in the disastrous elections, were clear in their intent. “Wise and virtuous as were the members of the 
Convention, experience has shown that the mode therein adopted cannot be carried into operation; for the people do 
not elect a person for an [E]lector who, they know, does not intend to vote for a particular person as President.”  Id. 
at 120. 
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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required each elector to submit one vote for President, and one for Vice President, instead of the 
Electors selecting their top two choices for President.118  The Twelfth Amendment guaranteed 
that the states could choose their mode of selecting Electors so long as the Electors 
“represent[ed], in a certain proportion, both the nation and the states.”119  Detractors rightly 
contested that the heart of the Constitution did not revolve around the will of the majority.120  
However, the Twelfth Amendment did not mandate majority will, but allowed states to decide 
their priorities in the interests of the states and the people when choosing a manner of selection.  
By securing the states’ right to choose the mode of selecting Electors, the Twelfth Amendment 
preserved the dueling interests of the states and the nation, guaranteeing effective participation in 
the Presidential process.121   
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN WTAS 
A. WTAS VIOLATE THE HISTORICAL VALUES OF PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 
The Constitution did not create WTA; it simply gave permission to states to create these 
laws.122  The use of WTAs began to catch on after the election of 1796, when Jefferson lost the 
election largely due to the strategic “scattering” of the Electors.123  In fact, if Virginia and North 
Carolina, both largely supportive of Jefferson, had a WTA system in place, Jefferson would have 
won the presidency.124  By 1824, all of the states had adopted state-wide WTAs, a tradition 
which has continued until today.  
The use of WTAs results in two trends that entirely define the modern presidential 
election process.125  First, WTAs create two classes of states in the context of a presidential 
election:  “battleground states” and “spectator states.”  These “battleground states” are 
reasonably defined as those states carrying the possibility of awarding their Electoral votes to 
either the Democratic or Republican candidate.126  In 2016, 94% of all campaign events took 
place in twelve key states.127  In 2012, campaigns purchased 96.2% of all political television 
                                                             
118 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  A secondary function was to foster a unified party ticket, moving votes from 
individuals to parties.  See CEASAR, supra note 27, at 104. 
119 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
120 See KURODA, supra note 94, at 150. 
121 See id. at 113-14. 
122 See Anglem, supra note 4, at 299 (describing states’ freedom in choosing Electors).  
123 See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (describing election of 1796).  
124 See Devin McCarthy, How the Electoral College Became Winner-Take-All, FAIRVOTE (Aug. 21, 2012), 
https://www.fairvote.org/how-the-electoral-college-became-winner-take-all (recounting election of 1796). 
125 See Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map:  Reforming the Electoral College with the District-
Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 233-34 (2012) (explaining how WTAs create “battleground states” and 
“spectator” states”). 
126 See A Recent Voting History of the 15 Battleground States, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/voting-history-of-the-15-battleground-states (describing battleground or swing 
states in America). 
127 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, Two-thirds of Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016 (showing breakdown of 2016 campaign events). 
 A MORE PERFECT ELECTORAL COLLEGE 20 
advertisement in ten battleground states.128  These battleground states regularly change their 
behavior to preserve their status, often jockeying to move forward their primary date to increase 
their relevance.129  In 2016, analysists identified fourteen states that could reasonably go to either 
candidate.130  The remaining “spectator states” are those where their support is a foregone 
conclusion.  Second, WTAs entirely discard the votes of the losing party in Electoral College 
representation, whereby 50.01% of a state’s votes translates to 100% of the state’s Electors 
awarded to the winner. By these two consequences that we weigh five aforementioned 
constitutional values against the historical constitutionality of modern WTAs.  
1. WTAS ENABLE FACTIONALISM 
By their nature, WTAs allow for factions that capture just over half of a state’s support to 
claim all of its Electors.  For example, the competing interests of slave states and those that did 
not allow slavery proved one of the most important factions the Framers concerned themselves 
with.131  To prevent this procedurally, the Framers created the two houses, the House of 
Representatives protecting the interests of the more populous states, while the Senate balanced it 
with equal votes to all states.132  Second, the Constitution created the Interstate Compact Clause, 
forbidding any state from entering into an agreement with another state without the consent of 
Congress.133  The Framers designed the Electoral College to address these issues by not only 
framing the electoral system as a proportional vote, but guaranteeing a degree of independence 
from otherwise political machinations.  However, with slavery abolished, we find that new 
categories of faction have emerged, namely states grouped as either conservative or liberal, and 
grouped as either battleground or spectator.  
The existence of two classes of states, alone appears contrary to the values expressed by 
the Framers in the drafting of the Constitution.  The thin margin of support separating the two 
prevailing political parties creates a battleground state.  As such, battleground states serve almost 
                                                             
128 See Nathaniel Peterson, The Geography of Campaign Spending, WRIGHT ST. U., https://liberal-
arts.wright.edu/applied-policy-research-institute/blog/article/the-geography-of-campaign-spending (mapping 2012 
political television advertisement spending).  
129 See BROOKINGS, Event Summary:  “Front Loading” the Primaries:  The Wrong Approach to Presidential 
Politics? (Jan. 14, 2004), BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/event-summary-front-loading-the-
primaries-the-wrong-approach-to-presidential-politics/ (describing “front loading” of state primaries).  
130 See generally REAL CLEAR POLITICS, Battle for the White House, REAL CLEAR POL., 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/2016_elections_electoral_college_map_race_changes.html 
(mapping likelihood of states’ presidential preference).  It is worth noting that Wisconsin, one of the most important 
electoral wins for Donald Trump, was not listed as a battleground state, but as a likely Democratic win.  Id.  
131 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing factions of slave and free states).  The shameful “Three 
Fifths” compromise of Article II is clear evidence of this divide.  See U.S. CONST. art. II.  Northern states were 
concerned with the Southern states receiving greater representation within the federal government, and by 
association presidential elections, by virtue of the number of their slaves.  See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying 
text.  This concern was not contained exclusively within the boundaries of presidential selection in Article II of the 
Constitution; it was too voiced in the debates over the Twelfth Amendment.  See Senator Timothy Pickering, Speech 
in Favor of the Twelfth Amendment (Oct. 17, 1803), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/T-
05321.02.pdf (commenting on division between northern and southern states). 
132 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
133 See Eric T. Tollar, Note, Playing the Trump Card:  The Perils of Encroachment Resulting From Ballot 
Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695, 703 (2018) (discussing purpose of Interstate Compact Clause). 
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as microcosms of the national political conversation, but distill the electoral process into high-
stakes campaigns in only a limited number of states.  The Framers, in their many discussions, 
identified that the people were the “only legitimate fountain of power.”134  States have 
continuously jockeyed over the last several years for earlier voting and primary dates in an effort 
to stay relevant in the national conversation of presidential elections.  Candidates know that 
votes in Ohio and Florida matter far more than Massachusetts and Idaho; this disparate treatment 
is detrimental to the rights of other citizens and defines this modern form of factionalism.  
Battleground states—the direct result of WTAs—have become the very factions that the 
Framers so feared and sought to avoid in their many debates and adjustments of the presidential 
selection process.  The abolishment of WTAs would undoubtedly result in the death of 
battleground states altogether, and would cure the issue of factions.  
2. WTAS ARE VULNERABLE TO EXCITEMENT AND DEMAGOGUES. 
WTAs consolidate the outcome of a presidential election in only a handful of states, 
removing the protection of the republican districting method.  The Framers, in their genius, 
designed voting districts to contain unbridled populism; however, the implementation of the 
WTA system substantially weaken districting’s check on populism. 
WTAs make a state vulnerable to a demagogue capturing a disproportionate amount of 
presidential support.  WTAs naturally produce high-stakes battleground states, and leave the rest 
of the states as spectators.135  In the past six presidential elections, no candidate has succeeded 
without capturing at least 62.5% of battleground states in the country.136  If a presidential 
candidate can focus their energy to capitalize in battleground states, it would mean that a 
disproportionate amount of states can impose their will on the entire nation.  
3. WTAS WEAKEN EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENCE FROM STATE LEGISLATURES 
 The Framers clearly feared a President beholden to the political or personal interests of 
the body that elected him.137  One of the greatest dangers the states saw in such a government 
was that their interests would not be secured, and concerns not be addressed.138  However, just 
like the individual must surrender some of their liberty within a Republican government, so too 
must the states surrender some of their sovereignty to a federal government. 139   
The Framers also knew that the legislatures and representatives of the states would be no 
exception.  The President must sign every bill brought forth by Congress, including 
                                                             
134 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 281-82 (James Madison). 
135 See supra Part III.A. 
136 See A Recent Voting History of the 15 Battleground States, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/voting-history-of-the-15-battleground-states. 
 (showing presidential outcomes from 1996-2012); 2016 Presidential Election Results, 270TOWIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/maps/2016-actual-electoral-map (showing 2016 presidential election results).  Of the 
sixteen identified battleground states, no presidential candidate has won with less than ten.  Id.  
137 See supra Part III.A.1 (noting evidence of congressional gerrymandering on national level). 
138 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing small states concern of interests being ignored). 
139 See THE FEDERALIST NO 2, supra note 20, at 5 (John Jay). 
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appropriations bills.  WTAs create a handful of battleground states that are disproportionally 
essential to winning the presidency.  It is not outside the realm of belief that if local politicians or 
members of Congress would support a presidential candidate knowing that the President would 
look fondly upon their state when the time came for federal appropriations.  Spectator states have 
far less to offer a presidential candidate, which could disadvantage them if a certain candidate is 
victorious.  
4. WTAS AND THOSE WHO SELECT THE PRESIDENT MUST KNOW OF THE CANDIDATE’S 
QUALITIES. 
During the course of the Constitutional Convention, Eldrige Gerry was the most 
articulate in identifying the challenges and shortcomings of the people.140  Members of the 
convention clearly distrusted the knowledge of the general voting population so much so that this 
distrust alone was one of the greatest driving forces behind the defeat of the NPV.141   
Technology has likely advanced in such a way that the Framers could not have imagined.  
Most people today have access to the internet either through computers or smartphones.  Social 
media and widespread access to news raises the general base of knowledge of the electorate.  At 
best, the abolition of WTAs would increase the meaningful exchange of ideas in a wider base of 
the electorate, and perhaps increase voter registration and turnout.   
5. THE MODE TO SELECT SHOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE’S WILL 
 The Framers knew that the mode of presidential selection must come from “some 
existing authority under the National or States Constitutions—or by some special authority 
derived from the people—or by the people themselves.”142  Quite simply, a republican form of 
government provides that the people choose those representatives who in turn create the laws to 
bind them.143  That simple system cannot be more indicative of the foundational concept of 
liberty and tyranny.  The people surrender a small portion of liberty to a duly elected 
representative of government in order to prevent tyranny, organize for common defense and 
interest and order, and promote order.144  While a branch of government may represent the 
interests of a state or a group of people,145 the only “legitimate fountain of power” lies with the 
people.146  
 At their core, WTAs transform 50.01% of the vote into the unilateral support of that same 
state in the Electoral College.  The Framers’ vision did not include this disregard of such a large 
section of the voting population.  Additionally, the near certainty of other states voting pattern 
denies the voters in those states a meaningful voice in the presidential election process.  Using 
either the Maine and Nebraska Manner or the National Popular Vote would create negative 
                                                             
140 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 327 (reporting Gerry’s proposal that Governors ought to select 
President due to distrust of general population). 
141 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing fatal flaw of NPV). 
142 MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 363 (quoting James Madison).  
143 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 211 (James Madison). 
144 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 20, at 5 (John Jay). 
145 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 supra note 20, at 209 (James Madison). 
146 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 20, at 281 (James Madison). 
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consequences for the presidential candidate that ignored the interests of the members of their 
political party in spectator states.  Providing a voice to the issues that voters in those states care 
about is the exact reflection of the will of all the people that the Framers intended—not just the 
will of the people in battleground states.  Thus, this Article now proposes a new system that the 
authors believe help remedy these constitutional concerns while comporting with the principles 
the Framers identified as important in selecting the President.  Regardless of the constitutionality 
of the current WTA system, the proposed manner is one that would benefit our political system. 
B. WTAS CONTRADICT THE MEANING OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 
 The passage of the Twelfth Amendment addressed the main deficiencies in the current 
elector system.  This Article approaches understanding the Twelfth Amendment by two different 
means.  First, by looking to the history of the amendment, we can understand the purpose of its 
passage and what deficiencies it intended to correct.147  Second, this Article interprets the text of 
the amendment to understand the normal meaning of the words as understood in their original 
usage.  By eliminating Electors’ ability to scatter or misdirect their votes, the Eighth Congress 
directed that Electors must “transmit” the votes of the people.148  Doing so ensured the Framers’  
WTAs at best do not serve, and at worst violate, the central principles and text of the Twelfth 
Amendment. 
The Framers coalesced around the idea of balance.  The Constitution thus guaranteed that 
states gave the people in their individual capacities, in their capacities as citizens of a state, the 
interests of smaller states, the interests of larger states, and the interests of regions effective 
participation in presidential selection.149  The principle of effective participation simply states 
that the people must have a voice within the election of a government official that represents 
them.150  Before the widespread application of WTAs, that representation came in one of two 
flavors.  First, the people chose their state legislator with the understanding that their 
representative would later choose presidential Electors that represented their interests.  Second, 
the people would choose an Elector who would do the same, either by general ticket or district 
ticket.  The Twelfth Amendment attempted to guarantee that the government heard the voice of 
the people—including the minority—and that states counted and transmitted their votes.   
WTAs undercut the principle of effective participation inherent in the Twelfth 
Amendment.  When a state’s citizens vote in presidential elections, they never provide 
unanimous support for a candidate.  However, if a minority voice garners enough support, they 
should be able to secure a voice of representation in the process.  Allowing a minority segment to 
secure such representation forces candidates to at least listen to the concerns of this segment of 
the electorate and respond accordingly.  WTAs, by constructively disregarding any electoral 
representation for the minority, allow candidates to ignore large, but nonetheless minority, 
                                                             
147 See supra Part II.B.1. 
148 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  This language was unchanged from the original text of Article II and was 
specifically debated within the Constitutional convention.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also FEDERALIST NO. 68, 
supra note 20, at 381-82 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing mandate of vote transmission).   
149 See MADISON’S JOURNAL, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting Alexander Hamilton discussing equality of suffrage 
essential to effective government).  
150 See cf., supra Section II.A.4 (explaining “consent of the governed”); see also cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
565 (1964) (acknowledging right of each citizen to “have an equally effective voice” in election process). 
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segments of the voting population.  This effectively eliminates the ability of those segments of 
the electorate to have any meaningful influence in the selection of the President.  Eliminating the 
minority voice runs afoul of the Twelfth Amendment’s guarantee of effective participation. 
The election of 1796 was decided by the party Electors’ unilateral support of one 
candidate with their first vote, and the subsequent scattering of their remaining vote to dilute the 
votes of their political opponents.  Thus these Electors were not effectively voting at all, but 
instead used their votes as partisan political maneuvering.151  The Twelfth Amendment intended 
to transform the Elector from a “discretionary trustee” to a “bound agent” by requiring the 
Electors to “transmit” the votes of the people.152  To understand the textual meaning of the word 
“transmit,” this Article looks to a number of dictionaries written and used at the time that the 
Amendment and the Constitution were written.153  
 Today the word “transmit” is defined as “to send or transfer (a thing) from one person to 
another” or “to communicate.”154  Reading the word as it was defined in the time of the Framers 
suggests that the word meant largely the same then as it does now.  The Framers defined 
“transmit” as “to fend155 from one person to another.”156  “Transmit” is also meaningfully used in 
the definition of two words:  “acquire” and “give.”  “Acquire” is defined as “to gain by one’s 
own labour or power; to obtain what is not received from nature, or transmitted by 
inheritance.”157  “Give” is defined as “to transmit from himself to another hand, speech, or 
writing; to deliver; to impart; to communicate.”158  A reading of these dictionaries written from 
1755-1775 all conclude that “transmit” meant a transfer or communication that does not change 
the original character of the object of meaning of the communication.   
 Looking at these varying definitions, WTAs certainly do not transmit the votes of a state.  
For example, in 2016, 47.4% of Florida voters supported Hillary Clinton in the presidential 
election, 48.6% supported Donald Trump.159  Yet, by merit of the WTA system, the Electors 
reported Florida’s unanimous and unequivocal support for only the Republican candidate.  The 
story in 2016 was the same in almost every single state throughout the country.  Indeed, the 
                                                             
151 See CEASER, supra note 27, at 104 (describing shortcomings of Second Amendment).  In addition to the 
scattering of votes, there were a number of different ways to spoil the votes of the majority.  See id.  For example, 
the defeated party could realistically throw all of their votes to the majority’s second place candidate, making the 
majority’s choice for Vice President win the election.  See id.  
152 See id. at 136. 
153 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77, 581 (2008).  When interpreting the text of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court is “guided by the principle that the Constitution was written to be understood by the 
votes; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary meaning.”  Id. at 576 (quoting United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).  Following the model set forth by Justice Scalia, this Article uses dictionaries at 
the time to determine the meaning of the word “transmit.”  See id. at 581-82.  
154 Transmit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2018). 
155 Fend, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 368 (1775) (defining fend 
as “to keep off” or “to shift off a charge”). 
156 Transmit, 2 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 360 (2nd ed. 1775).  
157 Acquire, JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 75 (2nd ed. 1755). 
158 Give, JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 903. 
159 See infra app. E (showing national preference). 
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WTA did not transmit the presidential preference of about 60% of states;160 instead, the WTA 
distorted them to express unanimous support of a single candidate.  WTA thus results in the 
votes of the people being transmuted, not transmitted, by the Electors who represent them.161  
Altering the preferences of the people of a state through WTAs thus violates the Twelfth 
Amendment by transforming the votes of the people, not transmitting them.  
IV. THE MORE PERFECT MANNER 
There is no greater thrill than watching presidential election results; hearing the iconic 
announcement:  “We now call the state of Massachusetts and its eleven presidential Electors for . 
. . .”  Nevertheless, when we hear “its eleven Electors,” most do not understand that Electors 
exist in two separate categories in every state.  The structure of Electors largely mirrors 
representation within the federal government:  1) the number of Electors proportional with that 
states’ seats within the House of Representatives (District Electors), and 2) a statewide Elector 
bonus of two Electors per state (Statewide Electors).162  District Electors, much like the House of 
Representatives, represent the preference of the state’s popular vote.  Statewide Electors, much 
like the Senate, award Electors for winning the state and protect the interests of smaller states 
when faced with the volume of votes in the larger states.  
A. THE THREE ALTERNATIVE MANNERS 
This Article contemplates three alternatives to WTAs:  the Maine and Nebraska Manner 
(MNM); the national popular vote (NPV); and our own invention, the Proportional Elector 
Manner (PEM).  This Article briefly explains each manner, and then proposes the PEM as the 
best possible alternative. 
1. THE MAINE AND NEBRASKA MANNER 
Although states predominantly use the WTA manner of Elector appointment, the states of 
Maine and Nebraska use a different system.  Under the Maine and Nebraska Manner (MNM), 
the plurality winner within each congressional district is allocated one Elector, with the plurality 
winner state-wide allocated the final two.  There is substantial merit to this approach, especially 
for states with a large urban population concentrated in limited areas of the state and rural 
communities extending across the remainder.  New York, Texas, and California, perhaps the 
most prominent examples, house some of the country’s largest cities.163  It is worth noting that 
Maine and Nebraska are themselves strong examples of states without large urban populations 
that benefit from the MNM. 
                                                             
160 See infra app. E (describing PEM).  In 2016, under the proposed PEM, there would only have been fourteen 
states (and D.C.) with unanimous support of a single candidate.  See infra app. E.  Using MNM, only sixteen would 
have unanimously supported one candidate.  See infra app. E.   
161 See 2 THOMAS SHERIDAN, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (1775) 
(defining transmute as “to change from one nature or substance to another”). 
162 The District of Columbia is the only exception to this rule, as they have no representation within National 
government, but in 1961, were afforded three presidential Electors.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.  The calculation 
for the District was difficult.  For the purposes of presidential accounting, that the District of Columbia would be 
counted as a state like Montana or Vermont, allocating one District Electors and two state-wide Electors.  When 
referring to “states” won overall, D.C. is included in those calculations.   
163 See Ten U.S. Cities Now have 1 Million People or More; California and Texas Each have Three of These Places, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 21, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-89.html 
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The Framers, in the original debates concerning presidential selection, and the subsequent 
debates over the Twelfth Amendment, considered, and even approved of, this manner.164  The 
MNM currently employed by the two states of its namesake assigns the choice of each 
congressional district that party’s presidential Elector, and the two Statewide Electors to the 
overall vote-getter in the states.  This manner provides for a tidy assignment of presidential 
Electors by congressional district, and appears to be the fairest way to count the election.  
Although a good idea, interference by bad actors is enough to spoil any system, including the 
MNM.  Indeed the MNM is susceptible to a consequent evil of political partisanship:  
gerrymandering.  
The Supreme Court—particularly in the 2018 term—struggled with developing a test for 
identifying a politically gerrymandered district.165  For the sake of brevity, the authors decline—
just as the courts have—to set forth a repeatable test that may be employed to determine a 
gerrymander has occurred.166  Nevertheless, for allegorical purposes, we can identify the issue 
much as Justice Stewart did with pornography:  “you know it when you see it.”167   
In 2008, Obama won 53.4% of the NPV to McCain’s 46%.168  Nevertheless, WTA 
inflated Obama’s victory considerably, assigning 365 Electors—67.8% of the college—to 
Obama.169  The 2008 distribution of the District Electors narrowly departs the NPV; by district, 
Obama wins 242 to McCain’s 194:  55.5% to 44.5%.170  Ultimately, both MNM and PEM 
closely reflect the national and district-wide vote, and seem to more closely resemble reality than 
WTA’s huge margin.  However, the two systems’ accuracies drastically depart in 2012.  
The MNM brings about troubling results when used to count the presidential votes in the 
last two elections.  President Obama’s incumbent victory in the 2012 election was less 
comfortable defeating Mitt Romney in the NPV 51.4% to 47.6%.171  How then, did WTAs assign 
61.7% to Obama and 38.29% to Romney?172  More importantly, how is it that the MNM would 
actually have elected Mitt Romney as President over Barack Obama, 50.19% to 49.81% (270 
                                                             
164 See supra Parts III.A-B (summarizing history and debates over Twelfth Amendment). 
165 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (declining use of efficiency gap test for partisan political 
gerrymandering).  The Supreme Court first created the test to determine that an unconstitutional gerrymander exists 
with “evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of 
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.”  See Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).  
However, the plurality in Vieth v. Jubelirer were unanimous only in their willingness to “jettison the test set forth in 
Bandemer.”  See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 877 (W.D. Wis.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).  In 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellants had not provided a 
reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders.  548 U.S. 399, 420-21, 423 (2006). 
166 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926-29 (2018) (outlining history of Court’s adjudication of 
gerrymandering claims).   
167 See Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (characterizing pornography as 
practically obvious yet difficult to legally describe).  
168 Infra app. C. 
169 Infra app. C. 
170 Infra app. C.  
171 Infra app. D. 
172 See infra app. D. 
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electoral votes for Romney and 268 to Obama), in the 2012 presidential election?173  The answer 
is deceptively simple:  a candidate’s success within the borders of a recently redrawn 
congressional district did not correlate to the candidate’s success within a state.  
Look at the historically conservative state of Alabama.174  In 2012, MNM’s accounting 
would’ve broken out only one district (14.3% of the state’s total districts) for the Democratic 
candidate and six districts for the Republican.175  How then does the vote count answer for 
Obama receiving almost 40% of the popular vote?176  On the other side of the coin, the 
historically liberal state of Massachusetts tells the same story.  In 2012, MNM assigned no 
Republican party victors in any of Massachusetts’s congressional districts.177  What explanation 
can Massachusetts then offer for almost 40% of its state voting for Romney?178   
The unfortunate truth is that the disparity between NPV results and Electoral College 
results is the result of a bitter, national struggle over partisan consolidation of power.  And if 
such obvious disparities between congressional districts being awarded to a candidate and the 
state’s overall preference is evidence of a wrongdoing, then in 2012, Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin all appear guilty.179  Indeed, “the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
but in ourselves.”180  Unfortunately, the simplest explanation to account for such a drastic 
disparity between statewide returns and congressional district victories between 2008 and 2012:  
the 2010 census, redistricting, and gerrymandering.   
                                                             
173 The MNM’s 2012 accounting of the presidential Electors would have been the second closest presidential 
election of all time, the first being Benjamin Harrison’s 1888 win by a single electoral vote.  See infra app. D 
(showing 2012 MNM election results). 
174 See infra apps. A-E (showing Alabama choosing GOP candidates in past five elections).  
175 See infra app. D. 
176 See infra app. D (showing 38% of Alabama voters supporting Obama). 
177 See infra app. D.  
178 See infra app. D (showing 37% of Massachusetts voters supporting Romney). 
179 See infra app. D.  Acknowledging the seriousness of this claim, a decision was made to assign a numerical value 
to identify the disparity.  The study first identified the margin of victory between the two parties in the respective 
congressional districts of each state.  Then, it identified the margin of victory in the state-wide vote.  Finally, it 
determined the margin between the congressional and statewide margins of victory and referred to it as the 
“discrepancy value.”  Only states with four congressional districts or more were analyzed as states with three or less 
congressional districts can exaggerate the discrepancy value.  As a preliminary matter in 2012, Florida, Michigan, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin all had a greater number of congressional districts vote for Romney, 
despite the state-wide majority vote going to Obama, which strongly suggests gerrymandered districts in those 
states.  See infra app. D.  The remaining named states all had a discrepancy value of 30% or more between the 
margin of victory of the victorious party by congressional district and the margin of victory by statewide vote.  This 
Article acknowledges there may be additional contributing factors to this statistic, but posits that allegorically, such 
a discrepancy should be a cause for alarm for all voters regardless of political affiliation.  Cf. Eric T. Tollar, Note, 
Playing the Trump Card:  The Perils of Encroachment Resulting From Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
695, 695-96 n.4 (2018) (exploring difficulties arising from use of statistical analysis).  
180 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act I, sc. II, l. 231-32. 
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Referencing the five most recent presidential elections, WTA is most guilty of inflating 
the margin of victory on the national level.181  MNM appeared sound until states meddled in the 
drawing of congressional district boundaries, and barring judicial intervention, the MNM system 
does not provide sufficient protection from partisan interference from state legislatures in what is 
a national interest.182  However, in the 2000 and 2016 elections, where the NPV disagreed with 
the Electoral College, the PEM reveals itself to be the most accurate manner.  
2. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 
Since the 2016 election, there has been an increasing trend to change election accounting 
to be determined via the National Popular Vote.  One proposal that is gaining momentum is an 
interstate compact, adopted by some and pending in other states, that would become effective 
once the adopting states collectively appoint a majority of the Electoral College.183  If adopted by 
an interstate compact, the NPV would maintain the Electoral College but with the adopting states 
pledging to allocate their Electors to whichever candidate won the NPV (including by a non-
majority plurality) regardless of the result in the state itself.184   
If a constitutional amendment was adopted instead as a substitute for the Electoral 
College, the NPV would constitute a direct democratic process in which the candidate with the 
most votes wins the presidency.  However, as a substitute for the Electoral College, the NPV 
fatally suffers from the problems identified by the framers when they considered and rejected a 
direct democratic process for selecting the President.185   
Further, the NPV adopted by interstate compact presents additional challenges, at least as 
presently contemplated.  If, for example, a fractious candidate wins a plurality of votes nationally 
but predominantly from one geographic, cultural, and political region, faring far less well in 
many other regions (including those in the northeast and west coasts where many states have 
already adopted the compact) then the peoples of the compact-adopting states will have 
committed their Electors to vote for that candidate, whom they themselves had rejected.186  
Indeed, the text of the Constitution, along with a plethora of historical evidence, command that 
Electors, and not the direct vote of the people, shall choose the President.187  Without an 
amendment to the Constitution, the NPV cannot be considered an acceptable alternative to WTA.   
                                                             
181 See infra app. F (ranking WTA, MNM, and PEM accounting); infra note 204 (explaining in depth the 
methodology of ranking test to determine overall accuracy). 
182 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (declining to establish a test to determine political 
gerrymandering).  This author contends that the MNM would be wholly appropriate for some states.  However, the 
proverbial genie (i.e., gerrymandering) is out of the bottle in many others.   
183 See generally JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL:  A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 
BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (4th ed. 2013).  
184 See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation (arguing in favor of NPV). 
185 See supra Parts II.A.2, 4 (outlining Framers’ explicit rejection of NPV). 
186 See supra Parts II.A.2, 4 (noting Framers’ objection to NPV).  
187 See supra Parts II.A.2, 4. 
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3.  THE PROPORTIONAL ELECTOR MANNER 
Beyond finding constitutional deficiencies in WTA and practical difficulties with NPV, 
this Article proposes an alternative to MNM:  What these authors call the Proportional Elector 
Manner (PEM).  Using this accounting method, candidates are awarded District Electors 
proportionally to each candidate based on the popular vote within the state.  The Statewide 
Electors are then awarded to the candidate in proportion to the state’s popular vote.  Proportional 
allocation of Electors is simple:  the percentage of the popular vote each candidate wins is 
divided by the number of District Electors available within the state.  This number represents the 
amount of District Electors that candidate will receive.  While straightforward on its face, PEM 
is still problematic as simple division does not yield whole numbers.   
To address this issue, PEM proposes “Jury Elector” accounting.  “Jury Elector” 
accounting is designed to be a simple, commonsense rule:  one may never “round up” an Elector 
to a whole number.188  The runners-up in a state are awarded as many whole Electors as their 
proportional vote earned them, and the state’s winner is awarded the remainder as a “bonus.”  
For example, in 2016, Illinois had 18 District Electors and two Statewide Electors.189  Clinton 
won 55.3% of the vote in 2016, Trump won 38.4%, Johnson took 3.8% and Stein took 1.4%.190  
Dividing Illinois’ 18 Electors by Johnson’s percentage would yield 0.68 Electors, and Stein’s 
percentage would account for 0.25 Electors.191  As neither candidate passes the threshold of 1.0, 
they are awarded no Electors.192  Dividing Illinois’s 18 District Electors by the state’s loser, 
Trump’s 38.4% of the vote comes to 6.91 Electors.193  As Jury Electors may not be rounded up, 
this ultimately means that Trump is awarded six Electors, and the other two candidates receive 
                                                             
188 This “Jury Elector” system is developed from two different areas of law:  jury satisfaction and the Constitution.  
For example, in Montana, a civil trial is permitted with as few as six jurors.  See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 
149-151 (1973).  Montana law provides that:  “At least two-thirds in number of any jury may render a verdict or 
finding, and such verdict or finding so rendered shall have the same force and effect as if all such jury concurred 
therein.”  MONT. CONST § 26 (emphasis added).  Using simple division, two-thirds in the case of a jury of ten is 6.7 
but would require rounding up to seven jurors to make a finding as 6.6 is less than two-thirds.  Id.  In the case of 
“Jury Electors” our rationale to round down was grounded in equity of the political process.  After all, the courts 
generally disfavor complex mathematical calculations in the application of law.  Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 
37-38, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (criticizing complicated mathematical calculations 
use in law).  Second, it seems inequitable to allow candidate who receives 0.1 of a hypothetical Elector to be 
awarded a whole Elector to the detriment of other legitimate candidates as such a method would lead to inaccurate 
accounting results.  Rather, by requiring that a candidate proportionally achieve at least one whole electoral vote, the 
method keeps consistent with other areas of election law jurisprudence that require a candidate to make a showing of 
substantial support in order to preserve the ballot for legitimate struggles.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983) (affirming a state’s right to require preliminary showing of substantial support for ballot 
access); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 709 (1974) (declaring ballot restriction unreasonable to achieve state interest 
of maintaining election’s integrity); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (affirming state interest in 
protecting political process by candidate showing substantial support from electorate). 
189 See infra app. E. 
190 Infra app. E. 
191 Infra app. E. 
192 Infra app. E. 
193 Infra app. E. 
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none.194  While Clinton’s 55.3% only triggers nine Electors,195 the elegant solution is that the 
victor takes the remaining Electors that the defeated candidates failed to capture.  As such, we 
award six District Electors to Trump proportionally, the 12 remaining Electors to Clinton 
proportionally, and two Statewide Electors to the overall winner of Illinois:  Clinton.196  
Ultimately, this would mean six Electors for Trump, and 14 Electors for Clinton.197   
B. PEM IS THE MOST ACCURATE MANNER OF ELECTOR APPOINTMENT 
The object of an election is to reflect or transmit the will of the electorate.198  However, 
the purpose of Electors is to represent two separate electoral interests:  the state’s interests and 
the people’s interest.199  The first of these is the will of the people as individuals; the second is to 
ensure that the voters of smaller states are not ignored by the vast populations of the larger 
states.200  District Electors are analogous to the interests of the people, much like the House of 
Representatives, and Statewide Electors are analogous to the interests of the respective states, 
much like the Senate.  
This article sets about the task of answering a deceptively simple question:  between the 
PEM, MNM, and WTA manners, which most accurately reflected the will of the people?201  
Considering the dueling interests of a presidential election,202 the authors compared the result of 
each of the three manners against three different data points.  The accuracy of each manner was 
compared against the result of (1) the NPV,203 (2) the winner based on congressional district,204  
                                                             
194 Infra app. E. 
195 Infra app. E.  Clinton won exactly 9.95 electors proportionally, but Jury Elector accounting forbids rounding up.  
See infra app. E.   
196 See infra app. E. 
197 See infra app. E. 
198 See supra Part II.A.5 (noting elections shall transmit votes of the people). 
199 See supra Parts II.A.2, 5 (outlining duel interests in elections).  
200 Id. 
201 In an effort to determine which of the MNM, PEM, and WTA manners most accurately reflects the will of the 
electorate, the authors calculated the outcome of the past five presidential elections if each of the three methods were 
used.  First, the authors determined the winner of the statewide vote for every state.  They then determined the 
margin by which the presidential candidate won each congressional district in each state.  Finally, they determined 
which candidate would win the state-wide Elector of the respective state.  Armed with this data, the authors 
identified the margins and results of these five elections using the proposed MNM and PEM accounting.  Once they 
determined how many Electors would be awarded to each candidate using each of the three manners, the authors 
converted those whole numbers into percentages in order to compare them for our accuracy metrics.   
202 See supra Section II.A.2, 5 (outlining duel interests in elections). 
203 For this test, the authors found the margin of victory in the NPV.  Then, the predicted margin of victory of each 
manner was calculated and measured to determine the difference between the two.  For example, in 2008, Obama 
won 53.4% of the NPV; McCain won 46.%.  See infra app. C.  Therefore, the margin of victory for 2008 is 7.3.  
Using the WTA accounting, Obama won 67.9% of the Electors, and McCain won 32.2% of the Electors, creating a 
margin of 35.7.  The difference between the NPV margin of victory and WTA accounting is 28.4 points.  
204 Finding the margin of victory in each state by congressional district, predicted the margin of victory of each 
manner, and then measured the difference between the two.   
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and (3) the winner based on statewide elections.205  After determining which manner was the 
most and least accurate in every year, each manner was ranked and calculated determining the 
average of each manner over the past five elections.206 
1. PEM BEST COMPORTS WITH THE FRAMERS’ PRIORITIES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Looking to the five principles by which the Framers weighed the proposed modes of 
presidential selection, the PEM most closely conforms to their values and prevents the ills they 
were meant to cure.  The PEM eliminates the modern faction of battleground states, making 73% 
of states able to award Electors to Democratic and Republican candidates.207  Proportional 
appointment of Electors would render battleground states more resistant to popular excitement 
and demagogues by disallowing the consolidation of electoral support.  The use of the PEM also 
subsequently breaks down the political capital of battleground states, ensuring greater 
independence of the Executive.   At worst, the electorate’s increased knowledge of candidates 
treats WTAs, PEM, and MNM equally. Finally, the will of the people would be more clearly 
represented by the PEM’s superior accuracy to other acceptable manner.208   
2. PEM IS MOST ACCURATE REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 
In calculating the accuracy of each manner to the NPV, PEM is the clear winner, winning 
13 points.209  WTA came in second with nine points, with MNM closely behind with eight.210  
Arguably, the most interesting pattern detected is that of the past three elections. In those 
elections, the rank of each manner is unchanged:  PEM was the most accurate, departing no more 
than five points from the NPV.211  WTA was the least accurate, with 16 points being its closest 
difference, and 28 points being its largest.212  On average, the ranking system proves that the 
PEM is the most accurate in reflecting the popular vote.  
                                                             
205 See infra app. F. 
206 See infra app. F.  After determining how each proposed Electoral College manners would account for varying 
results in the last five elections, the study then engaged in a simple ranking study.  This was done by ranking the 
accuracy of Electoral College outcome in order of manner closest to the NPV or against the preference of 
congressional districts in the last five elections.  See infra app. F. Table 1-4.  Then, for the past five elections, the 
most accurate was assigned a value of three, the second closest a value of two, and the least accurate manner was 
assigned a value of one.  See infra app. F. Table 5.  When measured against the NPV, the PEM was the most 
accurate with thirteen points, WTA the second most accurate at nine points, and MNM the least accurate at eight 
points.  See id.  When measured against preference by congressional district, PEM and MNM tied at 12 points, with 
WTA being the least accurate at six points.  See id.  However, because the PEM and MNM account for 
congressional districts in the exact same way, this tie was unsurprising.  Ultimately, recent initiatives for the 
Interstate Agreement to have Electors determined by the outcome of the NPV, then PEM’s accuracy becomes 
especially relevant.  Cf. supra note 177 and accompanying text.  
207 See infra note 240 and accompanying text (showing 73% of states supporting both Democratic and Republican 
candidates using PEM). 
208 See supra Part IV.B (describing accuracy of three manners).  
209 See infra app. F (demonstrating PEM’s accuracy to reflect the will of the people). 
210 See infra app. F. 
211 See infra app. F. 
212 See infra app. F. 
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There is no clear winner when calculating the accuracy of each manner compared to the 
percentage of congressional districts won by each candidate.  MNM and PEM are tied, with 
WTA as the clear loser.213  It is not surprising that the MNM performed well in predicting the 
percentage of congressional districts won; after all, that is its primary function.214  What is 
surprising is that PEM is equally accurate as MNM in reflecting the interest of congressional 
district votes.  
Determining the margin of victory between the states as a whole is not a useful 
measurement for two distinct reasons.  First, regardless of which manner of accounting the State-
wide Electors used, the accounting would be the same for each approach.  Second, the 
importance of the Statewide Elector seemed to change according to party.  Looking at the last 
five elections, Republican victory occurred only when 59%-61% of states voted for the GOP.215  
Democrat Barack Obama was able to win in 2008 with 57% of states, and in 2012 with 51% of 
states.216  Ultimately, because the statewide distribution of Electors would be the same in each 
manner, the analysis used only the two previously mentioned metrics. 
The data and ranking analysis revealed a clear winner and a clear loser when comparing 
the three manners.  PEM is the most accurate in reflecting the NPV, and equally accurate in 
predicting congressional district margins.217  In both of these categories, the WTA is the least 
accurate.218  Additionally, in analyzing the various elections, a troubling pattern emerged when 
the MNM was calculated for every state.   
The 2000 and 2016 elections joined the notorious ranks of the three other presidential 
elections where the preference of the popular vote was not the preference of the Electoral 
College.219  By calculating the results of the election under the NPV, MNM, and PEM, PEM 
accurately predicts and explains the outcomes of the 2000 and 2016 elections.  
In 2016, the final NPV reflected 48.9% of the vote for Clinton and 46.7% of the vote for 
Trump.220  However, WTAs did not reflect how close the race it was, with 42.2% of Electors 
                                                             
213 See infra app. F. 
214 See supra Section IV.A.1 (describing MNM). 
215 See infra apps. A-F. 
216 See infra app. C-D.  
217 See infra app. F.  
218 See infra app. F.  
219 See Rachael Revesz, Five Presidential Nominees Who Won Popular Vote But Lost The Election, INDEPENDENT 
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/popular-vote-electoral-college-five-
presidential-nominees-hillary-clinton-al-gore-a7420971.html.  2016 was the fifth time in American history that the 
candidate who won the popular vote lost the election.  Id.  Before this was Al Gore’s loss to George Bush in 2000, 
Grover Cleveland’s loss to Benjamin Harrison in 1888, Samuel Tilden’s loss to Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, and 
Andrew Jackson’s loss to John Quincy Adams in 1824.  Id.  Interestingly, Jackson’s loss to Adams is often pointed 
to as the spark that lead to Martin Van Buren nationalizing the presidential nomination process, which not only 
removed the power of nomination from presidential Electors, but is also largely the catalyst for WTAs and modern 
partisanship.  See CEASAR, supra note 27, at 144.   
220 See infra app. E.  Also included was 3.3% of the vote for Libertarian Party candidate Gary Johnson, and 1.1% of 
the vote for Green Party candidate Jill Stein.  Id.  
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voting for Hillary Clinton and 56.5% for Donald Trump.221  The most troubling characteristic of 
the Electoral College is how a two-point NPV victory for Clinton can translate into a fourteen-
point defeat once the votes are calculated using WTA.222  MNM’s accounting comes closer, 
awarding 45.72% of Electors to Clinton and 54.28% to Trump.223  But MNM still suffered from 
a fatal flaw:  the popular vote preferred Clinton.  The question is evident:  How did Trump win?   
The answer:  He won more states—61% to Clinton’s 39%.224  By using the PEM, it 
becomes evident that District Electors would have reflected the preference of the nation quite 
accurately. In 2016, we see the importance of the so-called “small-state bias”:  39% of states 
supported Clinton but 61% of states voted for Trump, we see the importance of the so-called 
“small-state bias.”225  Even with a relatively narrow margin of the popular vote favoring Clinton, 
far more states preferred Trump.226  Trump’s victory in 61% of states resulted in the PEM 
determining 48.9% to Clinton and 51.3% to Trump; the closest of the tested manners to the 
NPV.227   
The story of the 2000 election is relatively similar.  There, George Bush received 48.2% 
of the NPV, while Al Gore received 48.7%.228  Much like 2016, when the margins were narrow, 
the “small state bias” was particularly relevant.  Indeed, in 2000, Bush won 59% of the states to 
Gore’s 41%, securing Bush a victory via the Electoral College.229  It is worth noting that this 
“small state bias” is not exclusive to Republicans; in 2008, Barack Obama won 57% of the states 
to John McCain’s 43%.230  However in 2012, Obama was able to secure a victory over Mitt 
Romney by narrowly securing 53% of states to Romney’s 47%.231  
Ultimately, PEM is the most accurate accounting method due to its proportional 
accounting of a state’s popular vote and its minor exaggeration of the statewide bias.  It serves to 
not only balance the interest of the people, but the interest of the states as entities.  By not 
restricting the assignment of Electors to possibly-gerrymandered congressional districts, PEM 
fairly gauges the support of a candidate both within a state and amongst the nation.  
C. PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES 
For just a moment, let us theorize what the effects of implementing PEM could be.  First 
and foremost, we see that the Electoral College, by a number of different metrics, would more 
                                                             
221 See infra app. E.  Translated to percentages, the Electoral college went 42.2% for the Democrat, and 56.5% for 
the Republican.  Infra app. E. 
222 See infra app. E. 
223 See infra app. E. 
224 See infra app. E. 
225 See infra app. E. 
226 See infra app. E. 
227 See infra app. E. 
228 See infra app. A.  
229 See infra app. A.  
230 See infra app. C. 
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closely resemble the preferred candidate.  While the accounting may be more accurate, the result 
of the last three elections would be exactly the same.  But what could be the consequences? 
1. THE PEM WOULD GIVE A VOICE TO THE MARGINALIZED AND UNHEARD 
 In 2016, two thirds of the presidential campaigns were concentrated in just six states.232  
Indeed, PEM would not substantially alter the importance of the battleground states; Florida, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would continue to be hotly contested.  But take reliably 
Democratic, and largely ignored California.  For decades, Democrats could count on the states 
formidable fifty-five electoral votes to bring the Democratic hopeful a fifth of their way to 
victory.233  However, using PEM, only 37 of the Electors would have been awarded to 
Democrats in 2016, and 17 would have fell to Republicans.234  The story is the same for reliably 
Republican Texas, splitting that state with fifteen votes to Democrats, and twenty-three to 
Republicans.235  These results in both Democratic and Republican states demonstrate that PEM 
favors no political party.  Further, the minority party in those electoral giants would be given a 
voice; effective participation in the presidential electoral process.236  Minority votes in majority 
controlled states would finally be obtainable, and candidates would be forced to hear and 
respond to those voters concerns, or risk losing their votes.   
 The story is the same throughout the country.  WTAs naturally ignore the issues 
concerning most voters in spectator states, as the support of the state is a foregone conclusion.  
However, under PEM, 73% of the states could be considered “in play,” meaning that presidential 
candidates would be forced to adjust their political agenda to appeal to a much wider national 
audience.237  In doing so, the bitter and marginalized “issue politics” that burden our system 
could give way to a fascinating alternative.  Under PEM, nuanced and complicated approaches 
would be necessary to win the support of votes.  With enough moderate concerns in the 
forefront, the prevailing decider of our elections may not be issues at all, but the virtue, charisma, 
and leadership of the candidates for our country.  Indeed, the selection of the most virtuous to 
lead us was the future that the Framers so desperately wanted.238   
2.  PEM WOULD NATURALLY REGULATE SPECIAL INTEREST SPENDING 
 Political spending continues to be a major point of contention within our political 
process.  There are numerous challenges in tracking the spending on a candidate by PACs and 
                                                             
232 See Two-thirds of Presidential Campaign is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016. 
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235 See infra app. E. 
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238 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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special interest groups.239  However, in analyzing where candidates spend their money, two 
valuable conclusions become apparent.  
 First, political spending, just like campaign activity, is currently limited to a small group 
of battleground states.240  In the crucial weeks leading up to the 2016 general election, Trump’s 
spending in Wisconsin, later proven critical to his victory, exceeded $2.4 million.241  Florida saw 
about $18.8 million for Clinton, and $10.4 Million for Trump.  New Hampshire, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Colorado, and Nevada saw similar spending.  Compare all of these to the 
$8.2 million spent for national ads by Clinton, and the $6.9 million spent nationally for 
Trump.242   
 However, what if the collective $103.2 million dollars in media spending, rather than 
being concentrated in eleven battleground states, were spent in the thirty-six that would have 
valuable electoral votes for both parties?  By forcing candidates to spread their advertising at risk 
of ostracizing classic “safe” states, PEM would essentially depreciate the value of the political 
dollar.  This could result in three scenarios.  First, the power of the wealthy to control political 
elections through large donations would be diluted amongst more states, resulting in a more 
meaningful discussion of a wider array of issues.  Second, with less concentrated capital, it 
would likely result in increased volunteer participation in political campaigns, increasing the 
meaningful discourse between voters rather than just listening to soundbites and divisive political 
attacks.  Third, it would undoubtedly energize voters in otherwise “safe” states to register to vote 
and involve themselves in the political process.  Any of these three predictions would translate to 
a more honest and meaningful democratic involvement in our political system.  These are 
undoubtedly the values that the Constitution always meant to propagate to make our union more 
perfect. 
 For these reasons, we believe that the Supreme Court review of WTAs is not only 
necessary, but inevitable.  While the Framers’ intent may be used to shed light on the 
constitutionality of an issue, it is not a per se cause of action.  However opposed WTAs may be 
to the principles upon which the Framers relied, WTAs raise both historical and modern 
constitutional issues under the Twelfth Amendment.   
CONCLUSION 
  While the public may not trust the Electoral College, it cannot be forgotten that its use is 
mandated by the strictures of our Constitution.  WTAs, however, are not creatures of the 
Constitution; they are creatures of statute.  This Article asserts that is it not the Electoral College 
that so troubles the body politic; it is simply how the college is counted. 
Most importantly, the concept of proportional representation for a presidential election is 
neither novel nor unused.  Indeed, it is a concept utilized by the Democratic Party for the benefit 
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of their own party members to create “fair representation” in the nominating process.243  In 1968, 
the Democratic party nominated Hubert Humphry as its candidate for President despite his 
failure to participate in a single primary election.244  In response, the Democrats passed the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, which overturned the “unit rule,” which 
was a winner-takes-all provision that previously gave the winner of the convention all of the 
party’s support.245  The Commission was designed to create “fair representation” in the 
nominating process, and to ensure—not unlike the Twelfth Amendment—that minority factions 
could not use procedural rules to supplant the will of the voters.246  The Republican party’s 
opposition to proportional representation is dug deep into the culture of the party.247  Regardless, 
proportional representation appears to be the forward motion of our electoral process, with 
WTAs simply standing in the way.   
At its simplest, concentrating the outcome of the Presidential election in few states draws 
the frustration of the rest.  In the end, the solution itself seems simple.  By eliminating WTAs, we 
may take a step towards every voter waking on Wednesday morning after the presidential 
election, knowing that they have been heard, and they have been counted.  In the history of the 
United States, the process of presidential selection has been a journey of change and adjustment.  
These changes to the Constitution were central to the idea, born with our country, that the Union 
itself will never be perfect.  Eliminating WTAs builds upon the fair representation model and the 
political courage from the states of Maine and Nebraska whose increased political importance is 
on display for the rest of the country to emulate.  This forward thinking of the electoral process 
is necessary as we may, once again, strive to become more perfect. 
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